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It almost goes without saying that financial statements are an important source of information for equity analysts.
The quality of analysts' products - their advice to investors, in particular - is determined in part by the quality of the
financial information they work with. This observation has, of course, been reinforced in the last two years; as the
stock market bubble burst, analysts have been surprised, and investors have been damaged, by accounting failures.
No doubt the bubble was supported by speculative equity analysis that ignored information in financial statements.
But the quality of the accounting in financial statements has also been called to task. Appropriately so, but to
criticize accounting, we do need an understanding of what is expected of accounting.
I want to ask two questions:
What does "quality accounting" look like from an equity analyst's point of view?
How does the equity analyst deal with "poor quality accounting"?
The answer to the first question conveys what the analyst expects of the accountant and so characterizes accounting
quality. The second question focuses on the quality of equity analysis rather than the quality of the accounting. How
does the analyst recognize the imperfections of accounting - some of which are inevitable, I will argue -- and adapt
to them? Quality analysis deals with deficiencies in the accounting to produce a quality equity analysis product.
Before attempting to answer these questions, we had better have an understanding of what the equity analyst's task
is. I view analysts as primarily involved in valuation. Equity research reports culminate in a buy, hold, or sell
recommendation, and it is on this recommendation that analysts are called to task. To reach a recommendation, they
probe into the workings of the firm and its industry, they analyze financial reports, and they forecast earnings, but all

with the aim of assessing whether a stock is appropriately priced. Analysts challenge the current market price.
Accordingly, accounting quality is judged on how well it helps in evaluating the underlying value of stocks.

Framing the Quality Question: Why Investors Buy Earnings
Earnings, the accountant's bottom-line number, is the number that analysts rely on most in getting to their bottomline, the buy, hold, or sell recommendation. Analysts forecast earnings as the primary indicator of value. Stock
prices appear to be driven by earnings; if a firm's earnings are below analysts' estimates, its stock price typically
drops, and if the quality of its earnings reporting comes into suspicion, the price typically drops precipitously.
Investors are said to buy earnings.
Why should earnings have such a central role in equity valuation? After all, earnings are an accounting construct,
dictated by rules that are by fiat or justified by "general acceptance." Earnings involve estimates and thus can be
biased. Should not the analyst rather focus on the cash flow that investors are expected to receive? Surely investors
value cash, not earnings? Cash flows are "real" and not subject to the dictates of so-called arbitrary accounting rules.
Understanding why earnings are better quality than cash flows (at least in principle) is fundamental to dealing with
the issue of the quality of earnings.
Buying Cash Flows
Dividends are the cash that shareholders receive from owning shares; literally investors buy future dividends, not
earnings. One does not have to think long, however, before coming to the conclusion that focusing on the dividends
that a firm pays will not help much in valuing a share. Many very profitable (and valuable) firms do not pay
dividends, nor are likely to do so in the immediate future. It is inconceivable to think of Microsoft's share price as
based on the dividends it pays (which up to recently was zero). In the parlance of the Miller and Modigliani dividend
irrelevance concept, dividends have to do with the distribution of value, not the generation of value. The investor is
left with the dividend paradox: dividends are the payoff from owning shares, but forecasting dividends short of the
liquidating dividend does not indicate value (and firms are going concerns).
Modern finance texts recognize the irrelevance of dividends. They advocate forecasting cash flows within the firm
instead: What is the cash that the firm will generate from its operations? Discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis
applies this idea to valuation, and has been a prominent tool in equity analysis. DCF models forecast cash from
operations minus cash investment, that is, free cash flow. In accounting terms, the focus is on the cash flow
statement, not the income statement. Indeed when teaching DCF we teach students to forecast earnings but then to
"back out the accruals" to get to the "real" cash flows; that is, construct a forecasted cash flow statement. But does
this really work for equity analysis?
Consider the following cash flows for Home Depot, Inc., the home improvement retailer and second largest retailer
in the United States (after Wal-Mart). This firm has certainly generated value for shareholders, with its stock price
rising from $24 in 1998 to over $50 in 2002. Here are the numbers for Home Depot's free cash flow reported over
those years (in millions of dollars, except stock price):

Suppose one were an investor thinking about buying Home Depot stock at the beginning of its 1999 fiscal year and

received an analyst's report providing, in advance, the actual cash flows that were to be reported. There would be no
uncertainty, but how useful would these cash flow forecasts be in evaluating how much to pay for the stock? Well,
not much. Free cash flows are negative for three of the years because the firm used more cash for investment than it
took in from operations. And the positive free cash flow in 2002 was largely due to a large increase in accounts
payable and accrued liabilities. Free cash flow is a perverse measure of value added, for firms reduce free cash flow
by investing (to create value) and increase free cash flow by reducing or liquidating investments. Free cash flow is,
in part, a liquidation concept. For many a growing (and valuable) firm with a lot of investment opportunities (like
Wal-Mart), free cash flow is negative. Firms also increase free cash flow by delaying payments on accounts payable
and accrued liabilities.
Buying Earnings
Home Depot's operating income (under the cash flows here) has a different pattern. Not only are they positive, but
also roughly track the stock price. They have the appearance of being a better valuation attribute than cash flows. To
appreciate why earnings might be a better number to focus on, recognize the formal difference between free cash
flow (from operations) and operating income (that is, earnings from operations, before net interest expense):
Operating income = Free cash flow + Investment + Accruals
                                = Cash from operations - Investment + Investment + Accruals
                                = Cash from operations + Accruals
This is an accounting relation that always has to hold. Accountants, in effect, calculate operating income by adding
back investment from free cash flow and placing it in the balance sheet as an asset that produces future earnings and
cash flows. Thus accrual accounting, in most cases, gets rid on the offending investment in the free cash flow
calculation, so improving the quality of the number. (Where GAAP accounting expenses investments - as with the
investment in R&D - income is likely to be poor quality.) In addition, accrual accounting adds accruals to recognize
value added for which there is no cash flow. Thus revenue is recognized for sales in exchange for a receivable, even
though cash has not been received. And wage expense incurred to generate revenues is booked even though the cash
payment will not occur (in the form of a pension payment) until the employee retires.
This discussion is just a primer on accrual accounting as taught in every Accounting 101 class. But recognize the
quality implications for equity analysis. If the investor is concerned with the ability of a firm to add value, he wants
a measure that compares value added with value given up. Accrual accounting, in principle at least, tries to do this:
Recognize revenues and match the expenses incurred to generate the revenues against those revenues. In accounting
parlance, follow the matching principle. The cash accounting that yields free cash flow violates the matching
principle because it matches investment to produce future cash flows against current cash flow from past
investments. Therefore it does not yield a picture of value added from investment. Further, cash accounting does not
recognize value that is added or lost that does not involve a cash flow in the current period. In short, cash accounting
mishandles cash investment and fails to recognize changes in value (accruals) that do not involve cash flows.
I hope I have persuaded you that, for equity valuation, the analyst should focus on accrual accounting earnings
rather than free cash flow. Earnings, in principle, are of better quality for the purpose at hand. Analysts covering
Home Depot certainly forecast its earnings rather than its free cash flow, as they do for almost all companies. And
investors are justified in thinking about their purchase of a share as one of buying earnings rather than buying cash
flows. In the long run, a profitable firm (like Home Depot) must return positive cash flows, of course, as investments
slow and cash from operations exceed cash investment. But "in the long run we are all dead." Forecasting cash flows
in the long run (to value stocks) is not a practical solution.

The Tension in Accounting
You will notice that I have qualified the claim about the quality of earnings: Earnings are better quality than cash
flows, in principle. The difference between cash flow and earnings that yields the desired matching is a matter of
accrual accounting principle. But here is the rub: accrual accounting requires estimates and estimates can be abused.
Deciding what is an investment (to place on the balance sheet) is a matter of judgment (of what cash expenditures

are for future benefit and what are expenses to be matched in the current period.) Almost every accrual adjustment
to cash flow involves an estimate, whether it be useful lives for depreciation, collectibility of receivables to allow for
expected bad debts, or actuarial calculations for pension expenses. Herein lies the tension in accounting and, indeed,
the tension for the equity analyst who desires a quality measure of net value added through matching.
How is this tension to be resolved? At one extreme, one might argue that all estimates should be ignored, and the
accountant should revert to cash accounting. Under this accounting, there is no income statement and the balance
sheet reports only cash. That would be a sorry state for an analysis of Home Depot. At the other extreme, the
accountant estimates the value of the firm and books it to the balance sheet. This comprehensive mark-to-market
accounting presents a perfect balance (in principle) where value of the equity is equal to its book value. We have
questioned the cash accounting extreme. What of the other extreme?
With a perfect balance sheet, the analyst has lost her job. The investor merely looks up the net asset value on the
balance sheet, much as he would for an investment fund whose investments are marked to market; he has no need
for an analyst. Equity analysis is necessary only because of the imperfections of the balance sheet. Why, apart for
territorial reasons, would an equity analysis want an imperfect balance sheet? Why would a "low quality" balance
sheet indeed be the quality that is desired?

The Fundamental Analysts' Creed
I do not pretend to be definitive on this issue, but it seems to me that a statement of a principle, long enunciated by
traditional fundamental analysts dating back to Benjamin Graham, has an important bearing on the question.
Investing in equities, they said, is a matter of speculating about payoffs. However, some things we know with
reasonable precision and some things we do not. In carrying out fundamental analysis, don't mix what we know with
what we don't know (and must speculate about). Analysts can speculate and accountants can speculate, but
accountants have little comparative advantage in speculation. So, say the fundamental analysts to the accountant:
Report what you know but do not mix that with speculation; leave the speculation to us. Mixing soft, speculative
information with hard information only makes the task of speculation more difficult.
The investor, less concerned about the division of tasks between the analyst and the accountant, also has an interest
in minimizing speculation in the financial statements. Share prices are driven by speculation; indeed excessive
speculation can create stock price bubbles, as recent history attests. The investor requires financial information that
can challenge stock prices, information that can test them against the facts. The investor looks to financial reporting
to ground him in waves of speculative fever. Don't mix speculation with what we know.
The fundamentalist creed has its expression in the accountants' reliability criterion: Accounting numbers must be
measured with reasonable precision and be supported by objective evidence, free of opinion and bias. Accrual
accounting contains many estimates, of course, and (to be candid) I am not sure where the line is drawn. But the
demand for the reliability criterion in accounting is clear: don't mix what we know with speculation.
The reliability criterion leads to a number of insights about desirable features of accounting, to which I will come.
But first, let me entertain the idea of the accountant providing a perfect balance sheet which, one could maintain,
would be accounting of high quality.

The Perfect Balance Sheet
The demand for better balance sheets increased during the bubble. Balance sheets omitted intangible assets, it was
said, and so traditional accounting became less relevant. The modern firm's value is in its intellectual capital, its
human capital, and its structural capital, and these assets are not on the balance sheet. The practicing accountant
balks, for she understands how difficult it is to measure the value of these assets. The reason, of course, is that these
assets are speculative; indeed, "intangible assets" is inherently a speculative concept. Not only are these assets
difficult to measure, they are difficult to even identify. The accountant does well not to book these assets for she
then follows that creed: Do not book these assets for then you will be destroying information by mixing it with
speculation.

Indeed, under the way that accounting works, booking speculative value in the balance sheet destroys accounting
information. It is not true that accountants omit the value of so-called intangible assets. The assets are not on the
balance sheet, to be sure, but accountants also produce an income statement that reports earnings from those assets,
and earnings can be used to value a firm. When a balance sheet is marked to market - in pursuit of a perfect balance
sheet - the income statement becomes a statement of changes in market values, and changes in market values are
uninformative about value. Add in estimation error in estimating the (speculative) value of assets, and the income
statement becomes a statement of changes in estimates, destroying the information about earnings from matching
revenues and expenses that otherwise would be presented. The problem we now have of bad debt expense
representing the current period's experience plus the change in estimate for the previous period would be magnified
significantly.
Fair Value Accounting
This discussion carries warnings to standard setters who are increasingly leaning towards fair value accounting - and
a warning to analysts who have to work with fair value accounting. Fair value accounting tries to get the balance
sheet right and is a reasonable accounting for the interest-bearing assets and liabilities involved in financing
activities. But its application to operation activities is doubtful.
Consider the case of an analyst who is valuing a firm with investment in equities that are marked to market. During
a stock market bubble, the analyst is concerned that the firm's stock price might be overpriced, so she looks to the
accounting information to challenge the possibly speculative price. If the equity investments are carried on the
balance sheet at a speculative price and if comprehensive income incorporates speculative unrealized gains, the
accounting information may lead her to overprice the firm. Indeed, unless analysts are careful, one can envision a
scenario where speculative prices generate balance sheets that then are used to justify speculative prices. The
circularity creates a pyramid scheme that further promotes the bubble. Observe the gains that were booked on the
investment portfolios of Microsoft, Intel, and Cisco Systems (to name a few) during the bubble, only to be followed
by large unrealized losses as the bubble burst. A perceptive analyst who appreciated the bubble effect on the
accounting might have predicted those losses.
You see that fair value accounting implicitly assumes "market efficiency," but it is market efficiency that the equity
analyst is testing in order to reach a buy or sell recommendation. The fundamental analyst might rather prefer the
equity method to mark-to-market accounting (as with investments in equities representing greater than 20%
ownership), or proportional consolidation. For then he gets a number that is independent of prices.
Consider the case where fair values are not available from liquid markets, but have to be estimated - or should I say,
speculated about. Now the income statement not only includes possibly speculative gains, but also changes in
estimates. Not very good information, particularly when company management engages in the estimation. We have
the legacy of Enron; a good deal of its "fake profits" resulted from speculative mark-to-market accounting. We have,
of course, the models of modern finance to help with estimation, but while seemingly precise, they can lead to fake
precision.
We have had another experience with fair value accounting for operations. The accounting for pensions is quasimark-to-market accounting. During the bubble, gains on pension assets ran into the income statement, magnified in
some cases by high expected rates of return applied to bubble assets prices. These gains were a considerable portion
of earnings for many firms with defined benefit pension plans. Earnings, taken on face value, again reflected the
speculation in prices, so were a poor metric to challenge speculative prices. A perceptive analyst who understood
that these were low-quality earnings would have expected a significant increase in net pension expenses and lower
earnings upon the bursting of the bubble.
The lesson tells us: Beware of accounting that is based on prices, for it is of low quality in evaluating equity prices.
Let's go down the road of fair value accounting with care.

Revenue Recognition and Matching

By now you can see that I am a proponent of old-fashioned historical cost accounting, at least for non-financial
firms. The core principles of historical cost accounting are the revenue recognition principle and the matching
principle. These principles serve the equity analyst well. The revenue recognition principle says, simply, don't add
value in the accounts until you have hooked a customer. Speculating about future customers or future revenues is not
the accountant's role. Tell us what you know - about the success in winning customers - and leave the speculation
about future customers to the analyst. Further, match expenses to get value added, but minimize the speculation in
doing so. Under this prescription, financial statements are seldom likely to be a perfect indicator of value; indeed,
quality accounting must be imperfect.

Diagnosing Accounting Quality
I think I have supplied at least a partial answer to my first question: What does "quality accounting" look like from
an analyst's point of view? Implicit is also an answer to the second question: How does the analyst deal with "poor
quality accounting"? The analyst challenges the more speculative features of the accounting. Where income and
balance sheets are constructed with fair value accounting (as with Enron), he investigates. Where the more
speculative assets are candidates for impairment - like goodwill booked in an acquisition during a bubble or
capitalized software development costs -- he challenges the accounting. When prices are brought into the financial
statements - with mark-to-market for equities or the accounting for net pension assets - he has reservations. When
restructuring liabilities are estimated - another example of quasi-fair value accounting - he worries about possible
overestimation and credits future income. In short, in his exercise of challenging market prices, he develops
diagnostics that challenge the more speculative aspects of accounting.
I cannot lay out a comprehensive quality of earnings analysis here(1). Needless-to-say, the analyst must investigate
such issues as up-front revenue recognition (involving speculation about future customer behavior), allowances (for
bad debts, rebates, and warranties, for example), estimated useful lives, estimated residual values of leases, unearned
revenues, and "cookie-jar" reserves, and off-balance sheet liabilities, all of which are part of the standard litany of
complaints. (Apologies, in advance, for the poor disclosure on these items!)

Disciplined Speculation
The analyst also deals with the (necessarily) imperfect accounting by adding speculation. The analyst starts where
the accounting leaves off; he gives weight to the accounting and then adds speculation. If the accounting fails to
book R&D assets because they are too speculative, then the analyst's job is to add the speculation about the likely
success of R&D. The analyst adds value (so to speak) to the accounting. (Accountants can probably do a better job
of R&D accounting, particularly in cases where technical feasibility is established.) But if the firm is reporting
losses from current sales, the analyst takes note. He is reminded that, during the bubble, the accounting losses of
dot.com firms were ridiculed as being the result of out-of-date accounting, a relic of the Industrial Age unfit for the
Information Age (more speculation!). As is turns out, those losses were a good predictor of outcomes.
The analyst's speculation involves forecasting the future that (quality) accounting ignores. But the forecasting must
be disciplined, and here the accounting also has a role. To do this, the analyst must ask what is to be forecasted in
order to capture the value that is not already indicated on financial statements. This question is really a question of
how to account for the future. My earlier comparison of cash and accrual accounting supplies an answer: forecast
(accrual) earnings, not cash flows. Indeed, analysts do forecast earnings. Discipline is demanded as follows: If
speculation about the future is justified, it must be that the speculative scenario forecasts earnings. An analyst might
embrace speculation about "knowledge assets," "organizational capital," "internet real estate," "the golden age of
technology," or the value of R&D, but these ideas must be submitted to the discipline of earnings forecasting. Stock
prices must be justified by earnings, not simply ideas or conjectures: How much earnings will a so-called "value
driver" produce? What will be booked in the accounts? Forcing speculative ideas through the discipline of earnings
forecasting challenges the speculation.

The Quality of Earnings Forecasts

The quality of equity analysis rides on the quality of the forecasting. The quality of the accounting comes into play,
for the quality of the analyst's speculation (about future earnings) is only as good as the quality of the earnings
forecasted. We have made the point that earnings forecasts are of better quality than cash flow forecasts, but is the
analyst secure in forecasting GAAP earnings?
Omissions from Net Income
GAAP net income and earnings per share misses aspects of a firm's operations that bear upon the valuation of
shares.
First, some income bypasses the income statement under dirty-surplus accounting. One effect is that firms can
cherry pick realized gains into the income statement and unrealized losses into the equity statement. Comprehensive
income reporting requirements have drawn attention to this problem, but have not dealt with it thoroughly.
Second, and more perniciously, GAAP fails to distinguish the financing and operating components of share issues
and repurchases. A share issue or repurchase at market value (that is, a zero-net-present-value financing transaction)
does not affect per-share value, but share transactions at prices different from market value involve a loss to
shareholders. GAAP does not recognize the compensation cost that arises from shares being issued to employees (in
exercise of options) at less than market price. GAAP does not recognize losses to the current shareholders from the
conversion of bonds, preferred stock and warrants into equity. GAAP does not recognizes losses from the
repurchase of shares at a price higher than the market price under put option and forward purchase agreements. For
employee stock options, grant date accounting is being proposed by both the FASB and the IASB, but the contingent
loss so recognized falls short of recognizing realized losses to shareholders on the exercise of the options.
These deficiencies require that the analyst work with comprehensive earnings rather than net income, and to
recognize the expenses hidden in GAAP reporting. If one values a share from forecasts of GAAP net income, one
will overvalue the firm, for GAAP income misses elements of value. If, for example, the analyst forecasts next
year's GAAP earnings, but fails to appreciate an anticipated loss from an (off-balance-sheet) obligation to
repurchase shares at less than market value, she will be in error.
Conservative Accounting Generates Earnings Growth that Should Not be Valued
It is sometime argued that conservative accounting is quality accounting (the label sounds like it!). Conservative
accounting writes down net assets in the balance sheet; it is the counter to fair value accounting that can write up
assets. However, conservative accounting generates earnings growth. Worse, it generates earnings that should not be
valued by the equity analyst.
Consider the following earnings forecast made at date 0 when the book value of equity was 100.

The earnings forecast has been converted to a residual earnings forecast by charging forecasted earnings with a
required return (at 10%) on the book value (net assets) that produce the earnings. You can see that residual earnings
are forecasted to grow at 3% per year, so a residual earnings valuation is developed as follows:(2)

Value of equity = Book value + Present value of expected residual earnings

Suppose, now, that this firm decided to write down inventory in Year 0 by 8 (as an application of conservative
accounting), so reducing Year 0 earnings to 4 rather than 12 and reducing book value to 92 from 100. Suppose that
the inventory is to be sold in Year 1. The lower inventory in Year 0 becomes lower cost of good sold in Year 1,
resulting in higher earnings, so the pro forma is revised as follows (holding all else constant):

Notice that Year 1 earnings have been created by the Year 0 charge (which could also be due to an over estimate of
bad debts, a restructuring charge, or the addition to a deferred revenue cookie jar). The diligent analyst revises his
earnings Year 1 earnings forecast accordingly. But the quality analyst also recognizes that the added earnings,
created by the accounting, does not add value. The residual earnings valuation now proceeds as follows:

The value of the equity has not changed. The lesson for the analyst is clear. Earnings forecasts must always be
converted to a valuation with a valid accrual valuation model. The residual earnings valuation models protects the
analyst from paying too much for earnings that are created by the accounting for it imbeds the accrual accounting
property that future earnings cannot be created with accounting methods without reducing the book value. Using
earnings and book value together cancels the accounting effects. Write-downs add to forecasted earnings, but when
those higher earnings are matched with the lower book value than generates them (in a residual earnings valuation),
the calculated value is unaffected.

Summary: Quality Accounting and Quality Analysis
The outline of how the analyst deals with the issue of accounting quality is now complete. The analysis insists that
the accountant stick to the facts and minimize speculation. She requires unbiased revenue recognition and matching.
She recognizes that, because of this demand, financial statements are incomplete for equity valuation. So she
proceeds to add speculation with forecasts, but within the discipline of forecasting comprehensive earnings corrected
for expenses hidden under GAAP.
Understanding that the ideal of unbiased revenue recognition and matching may not prevail, she investigates the
quality of the accounting in the current financial reports with two issues in mind. First, she asks whether speculative
income has been booked, for she recognizes that that income may not be sustainable. She is particularly wary of fair

value accounting. Second, she also realizes that bias can be introduced in the other direction with conservative
accounting; and while reporting lower current earnings, it creates future earnings. She adjusts her forecast
accordingly by using the accrual accounting residual earnings valuation model; she protects herself from adding
value for the enhanced earnings.

Endnotes
1 For more discussion, refer to my paper, "The Quality of Financial Statements: Perspectives from the Recent Stock
Market Bubble" Accounting Horizons, Supplement 2003, pp.77-96.
2 See Chapter 6 of Stephen H. Penman, Financial Statement Analysis and Security Valuation (New York; McGrawHill Companies, 2001) for an explanation of residual earnings valuation. Chapter 17 has a comprehensive analysis
of the effect of conservative accounting on earnings forecasts and equity values.

